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Abstract
We argue that CEOs have different attitudes toward the firm’s stakeholders and that these differences in
attitudes affect the firm’s decision making. We hypothesize that these differences stem from differences
in political ideology: Liberal CEOs, as compared to their conservative counterparts, pay less attention to
shareholders and this is reflected in dividend policy. To test the validity of our hypothesis, we measure
CEO ideology by political donations. We study the CEOs of S&P 500 firms during 1997-2014 and
find that firms with liberal CEOs are less likely to pay dividends and have significantly lower dividend
payouts. In contrast, conservative CEOs pay more dividends, even if this requires redundancies.
Keywords : CEO Political Ideology, Dividend Policy, Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Gover-
nance
JEL classification: G35, G34
1. Introduction
In 1919, when Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motor Company, refused to distribute
a proportion of his company’s enormous profit in the form of a dividend, John and Horace
Dodge — two minority investors in the firm — brought a lawsuit against him. Taking the
Dodge brothers’ side, the Michigan Supreme Court went against Ford’s provocative claim
that the money could be used for making cheaper cars for the customers and for paying
better wages to the employees. The court argued that the primary objective of a business
corporation is about making a profit for its stockholders (Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 1919).
This classic case generates three important stylized facts. First, business executives may
have different attitudes toward the firm’s stakeholders. Second, their attitudes may directly
impact the firm’s policies and decisions. Third, a CEO’s attitudes may go against societal
norms and regulations. Despite their importance, the effects of managerial attitudes on firm
policies have remained largely unexplored and our knowledge is limited to a few empirical
studies. More specifically, we do not as yet have sufficient knowledge of what might shape
the attitudes of executives toward a specific group of stakeholder and how these attitudes
affect corporate outcomes. This paper examines the role of CEO political ideology as a
driver of CEO attitudes toward the firm’s stakeholders, aiming to shed light on the effect of
CEO conservatism versus CEO liberalism on the firm’s dividend policy.
This research builds on the view that the firm is a nexus of contracts between differ-
ent parties (Coase, 1937). The CEO makes strategic decisions at the center of this nexus
(Mitroff, 1983; Hill and Jones, 1992) and his role demands him to be more like “a juggler
of constituencies than a pilot at the helm of a great corporate ship” (Agle, Mitchell, and
Sonnenfeld, 1999, p. 520). Any decision made by the CEO is likely influenced, at least to
a certain degree, by stakeholder expectations and the priority he gives to competing stake-
holder claims (Ansoff, 1984; Allen, 2005). Central to the CEO’s decision is “the principle of
who or what really counts” (Freeman, 1994, p. 4). Who catches the CEO’s attention while
making an important decision depends not only on the relative power of various stakeholder
groups and the legitimacy and urgency of their claims, but it also depends on the CEO’s
perception of the relative importance of the various stakeholder groups (Mitchell, Agle, and
Wood, 1997).
In this context, it is critical to understand the CEO’s attitudes toward various stakeholder
groups and why the CEO prefers a group of stakeholders over the others. More specifically,
why should a CEO prioritize shareholder interests over the interests of other stakeholders?
The prevailing shareholder-stakeholder debate in the corporate governance literature has at-
tempted to explain differences in the CEO’s prioritization of various stakeholders by typically
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focusing on the country rather than the firm level of analysis (Allen, 2005; Yoshimori, 1995).
With regard to employees and shareholders, evidence suggests that there is substantial cross-
country variation in the main objective of the firm. For example, in Japan employee interests
take precedence over shareholder interests. In turn, the Codetermination law in Germany
ensures that both employees and shareholders have board representation and, hence, a voice
in the way the firm is managed. In contrast, in the USA and the UK, the shareholder-centric
view prevails.
These cross-country differences may explain CEO preferences given that CEOs are ex-
pected to conform to the societal norms and regulations of their country and take corporate
actions that are in line with these. For example, CEOs in the USA should be more likely
to cater to shareholder concerns and adopt policies that maximize shareholder value while
paying less attention to employee interests.
However, there may still be within-country variation in CEO preferences and attitudes.
To date, there is as yet limited literature that attempts to explain such within-country dif-
ferences in preferences by focusing on the personal attributes of corporate decision makers.
Using a survey questionnaire, Sturdivant and Ginter (1977) find that the best (worst) so-
cially performing firms, as identified by the media, are led by executives who maintain liberal
(conservative) attitudes toward business and social issues and are expected to promote (de-
mote) corporate responsiveness to ecological matters, employee welfare, consumerism, and
the like. Further, Sturdivant (1979) observes fundamental differences between the values of
executives and a group of stakeholders (namely activists). He finds that the executives of
the best socially performing firms have higher liberal scores and are more sensitive to stake-
holder concerns.1 Sonnenfeld (1981) investigates the perceptions of executives of different
stakeholders. He examines the quality and quantity of interactions between the functional
departments and the key stakeholders in firms operating in the forestry industry. He finds
that executives responsible for a particular stakeholder group are more critical and less tol-
erant of that group. On the contrary, executives with relatively little interaction time with a
given stakeholder group are more sympathetic to the concerns of that group. For example,
human resource managers are more open to financial stakeholder concerns than finance ex-
ecutives. Adams, Licht, and Sagiv (2011) study the personal values of board members and
CEOs in Sweden. They find that these values have predictive power of how much emphasis
the CEO puts on shareholders relative to stakeholders. Specifically, they find that direc-
tors and CEOs that endorse greater achievement, power, and self-direction values and lower
1Sturdivant (1979) uses the management attitude survey developed by Sturdivant and Ginter (1977). He
positions the response groups with respect to each other on a dimension of a “broad” (i.e., liberal) to “narrow”
(i.e., conservative) view of business and social issues. A high liberal score means that the respondent has a
broad view of business and promotes corporate responsiveness to social issues.
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universalism values tend to focus on shareholders.2
More recent studies go beyond the sole investigation of the origins of CEO attitudes
by providing evidence that link CEO personal values as well as CEO perceptions toward
different stakeholders to CEO decision making. Chin, Hambrick, and Trevin˜o (2013) find
that liberal CEOs make greater advances in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and thus
give greater attention to broader stakeholders when making decisions. Briscoe, Chin, and
Hambrick (2014) investigate the formation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
employee groups in major corporations and provide evidence that the political liberalism of
the CEO influences the likelihood of activism within the corporation as manifested by the
formation of such groups.
Building on these contributions, we study how the political ideology of the CEO as a
key determinant of the CEO’s attitudes toward shareholders and other stakeholders affects
dividend policy. Shareholders provide the firm with the necessary capital and in turn expect
a return on their investment (Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). The dividend
is then a mechanism through which the CEO may return money to the shareholders. The
relative importance accorded to shareholder interests and worker interests has always been
subject to debate between individuals of a left political leaning and those of a right political
leaning. More precisely, CEOs with conservative views are expected to put more emphasis
on capital and consequently one expects right-wing CEOs to pay more attention to share-
holders. We hypothesize that this attention reflects itself in the firm’s dividend policy. If
the hypothesis is valid, conservative CEOs are expected to pay more dividends.
The corporate governance literature is not unfamiliar with the argument that right-wing
politics favors shareholders over workers (at least at the country level). Specifically, Roe
(2003) argues that the reason why corporate ownership has become dispersed in some coun-
tries while it remains concentrated in others can be explained by how individual countries
maintain social peace by resolving the inherent conflict between workers and investors. He
argues that, unlike right-wing countries, the social democracies of Continental Europe prefer
workers over investors and this preference reflects itself in government policies and regu-
lations. The political orientation of the government is then the main determinant of the
relative degree of attention given to investors and workers. We follow the same logic at firm
level rather than country level by studying the dividend policy of conservative and liberal
CEOs (see also Bank, Cheffins, and Goergen, 2009).
2They utilize the personal value measures developed by Schwartz (1992). Achievement is related to
personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards; power refers to social
status and prestige; self-direction refers to independent thought and action-choosing; and universalism is
understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection of the welfare of all people and for nature. For a
complete list of values and their definitions, see Adams et al. (2011).
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We exploit a dataset that comprises CEOs of S&P 500 firms and covers the period of
1997 to 2014. The use of political donation data for capturing the political ideology of the
CEO has recently attracted much attention from management and finance scholars (e.g.;
Elnahas and Kim, 2017; Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar, 2014; Briscoe et al., 2014). Similar to
these studies, we use the political donations to the Republican and Democratic parties made
by each individual CEO to measure the CEO’s level of conservatism and liberalism. We find
that firms with liberal CEOs are more likely to be at the helm of non-dividend paying firms
and firms with consistently lower dividend payouts. However, and contrary to expectations,
we do not observe a difference in the likelihood of dividend cuts, omissions, initiations, and
re-initiations between liberal and conservative CEOs.
This paper contributes to at least three strands of existing research. First, it contributes
to the strand of the strategic management literature that studies the relationship between
management and stakeholders by providing evidence that CEOs vary in their attitudes to-
ward stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997). Further, these differences
in attitudes are driven by differences in CEO political ideology. Second, our paper comple-
ments previous findings that point to the importance of CEO personal attributes for firm
policies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). More specifically, this
paper adds to the growing literature that investigates the effects of the political ideology of
the CEO on various firm decisions (e.g.; Elnahas and Kim, 2017; Hutton et al., 2014; Briscoe
et al., 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Unsal, Hassan, and Zirek, 2016; Francis, Hasan, Sun, and
Wu, 2016). Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that studies how CEO attributes
affect dividend policy (e.g.; Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe, 2013; Caliskan and Doukas, 2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3
explains the sample selection and methodology. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis.
The next section carries out a battery of robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 contains the
discussion and ends with concluding remarks.
2. Related Work
2.1. CEO Effects on Firm Decision Making
The effects that managers may have on firm behavior and performance have long been
debated by organizational theorists (e.g.; Chandler, 1962; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Ham-
brick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Mackey,
2008; Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). An increasing amount of empirical research has explored
the magnitude and nature of these effects. The earliest discussions involve two antagonistic
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views: the first one arguing for the importance of managerial effects on corporate perfor-
mance (e.g.; Child, 1972; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and the second one arguing for the
negligibility of managerial effects, but the importance of structure and environmental fac-
tors (e.g.; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Not surprisingly, the
empirical voyage in this area begins with research aiming to quantify the fraction of the
variance in firm performance that is explained by executives (e.g.; Lieberson and O’Connor,
1972).3 In reaction to this apparent polarity, the focus of research has moved away from
the question of whether and to what extent managers matter to the question of when and
under what circumstances they matter (e.g.; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick and
Abrahamson, 1995; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007; Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005;
Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). For example, the effects of managers on firm performance
has been shown to be moderated by factors such as managerial discretion, the managerial
labor market, overconfidence and board gender diversity (e.g.; Hambrick, 2007; Malmendier,
Tate, and Yan, 2011; Chen, Leung, Song, and Goergen, 2019).
This literature has changed track ever since to explore two additional, promising and
related directions. The first direction emerged from the realization that managers cannot
be regarded as perfect substitutes for one another (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Contrary
to the main assumption of the neoclassical theory of the firm, managers have idiosyncratic
styles and have distinct characteristics. These differences in characteristics are predicted to
translate into heterogeneous strategic actions. Second, the focus has shifted partly from the
direct emphasis on firm performance to specific firm policies such as corporate risk taking
(Cain and McKeon, 2016; Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012), corporate investment
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015), and firm financial policy
(Malmendier et al., 2011; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013).
To sum up, even though the research on the effects of the CEO on firm policies has
passed the infancy stage, we still only have a limited amount of empirical evidence on how
CEO values and attitudes toward different stakeholders shape the firms policies. This study
investigates how CEO political ideology (as a proxy for CEO attitudes toward shareholders
and stakeholders) determines the firm’s dividend policy.
2.2. Political Ideology of CEOs and Firm Policies
There has been a surge in the number of studies focusing on the political ideology of CEOs
and other board members. Evidence supports the view that conservative and liberal CEOs
3Discussions and empirical inquiries around this as yet unsettled debate are still developing in the litera-
ture. For examples, see Hambrick and Quigley (2014); Fitza (2014); Quigley and Graffin (2017) and Quigley
and Hambrick (2015).
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behave differently and have different management styles. Republican CEOs are more likely to
follow conservative corporate policies. For example, they raise lower levels of corporate debt,
invest less in research and development (R&D) and undertake less risky investments (Hutton
et al., 2014). Republican CEOs also engage in fewer mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and,
when they do, they are more likely to acquire public firms within the same industry and
use cash as the method of payment (Elnahas and Kim, 2017). Unsal et al. (2016) find
that the effects of lobbying on firm performance vary across firms with different managerial
political orientations and excess lobbying (i.e., higher lobbying expenditure and lobbying a
larger number of bills) failing to create value for firms with conservative managers. Francis
et al. (2016) associate Republican CEOs with more corporate tax sheltering even when their
wealth is not tied to that of the shareholders and when corporate governance is weak. At
the board level, Kim, Pantzalis, and Park (2013) find evidence that the monitoring effect
of outside directors is more likely to be improved when the political views of the outside
directors are distinct from those of the management. Further, ideologically diverse boards
are associated with better firm performance and lower agency costs. Finally,Gupta, Briscoe,
and Hambrick (2018a) use CEO political ideology as an explanation for even-handedness
in resource allocation, defined as the degree to which every unit in an organization receives
the same capital allocation. They observe that liberal CEOs favor even-handedness, while
conservative CEOs support the view that resources should flow to their most efficient users,
and hence such CEOs tolerate greater disparity.
3. Sample Selection and Methodology
3.1. Sample Selection
We collect CEO data from ExecuComp and match it with firm financial data obtained
from Compustat. The sample includes all the executives who served as the CEO of an S&P
500 firm for at least three consecutive years between 1997 and 2014. This sample is then
merged with board data obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Director
database. The initial sample consists of 872 CEOs and 5713 CEO-year observations. After
constructing the dependent and control variables and discarding missing observations, the
sample contains 736 CEOs and 2959 CEO-year observations.
For each CEO in the sample, we obtain political donation data from the Federal Election
Commission (FEC). The FEC is an independent regulatory agency and has jurisdiction over
the financing of political campaigns in the United States. It has been publicly disclosing
detailed information about all financial contributions by individuals to the federal elections
6
that exceed $200 since 1979. We scrape the data directly from the FEC web page using its
OpenAPI platform. We manually check the harvested data and filter out CEOs from other
donors with similar names, using information about occupation, employer and address. As
some CEOs made several donations to a party in a given year, for each year we aggregate
the donations to obtain the dollar value of the total contributions to each party made by
each CEO.
The CEO donations recorded by the FEC consist of direct donations which are the
contributions made by the CEO individually to candidates or party committees, as well as
indirect donations which are the donations made via a Political Action Committee (PAC).
The direct and indirect donations differ in two ways. First, in making a direct contribution,
the CEO has complete control over which politician or political party receives the donation.
In contrast, a donation made by the CEO indirectly via a PAC passes through a third party,
which determines their ultimate candidate and political party recipients (Fremeth, Richter,
and Schaufele, 2013). Second, the aggregate direct donations made by executives have been
shown to be consistently partisan across election cycles, a pattern similar to that of ordinary
donors but in contrast to the donation patterns of corporate PACs (e.g.; Cooper, Gulen, and
Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Bonica, 2016). Given these differences and following previous studies
(e.g.; Hutton et al., 2014), we only consider CEOs’ direct contributions to the Republican
and Democratic parties. In total, we have 8422 observations of annual, aggregated direct
donations.
Out of the 736 CEOs in our dataset, 632 CEOs have made at least one donation to
a political party since 1979 and 546 CEOs have made at least one donation to a political
party during their tenure as a CEO of an S&P 500 firm. As we discuss in the following
sub-sections, we construct our measure of political ideology considering the donations made
during the CEO’s tenure only. After merging the main dataset with the political donation
data, we end up with a final sample of 546 CEOs and 2302 CEO-year observations.
3.2. Measuring the Political Ideology of the CEO
Poole and Rosenthal (1984) report a rise in the polarization of politics beginning with
the 1970s when the Republicans and the Democrats became more divided along ideolog-
ical lines, with the Democrats holding consistently liberal positions and the Republicans
promoting exclusively conservative ones. Later studies confirm this polarization, suggesting
its continuation and strengthening over time (e.g.; McCarty, 2006; Poole and Rosenthal,
1997; Johnston, Manley, Jones, and Rohla, 2018). Evidence also suggests that both voters
and political activists (including those who contribute money to candidates or parties) are
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also more separated across party lines and that their partisanship is increasingly aligned
with their ideological preferences (Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009; Layman, Carsey,
Green, Herrera, and Cooperman, 2010; Layman and Carsey, 2002).
Contributing to political parties is common practice among the leaders of big corporations
in the United States. Considering the life-time donations, eight out of ten CEOs makes at
least one donation to a political party. Seven out of ten CEOs in our sample made at least
one donation to a political party during their entire tenure as a CEO of an S&P 500 firm.
The mean for total political donations during the period covered by the FEC is $31000 for
individuals who are CEOs of S&P 500 firms during our period of study (i.e., 1997-2014). The
mean is $11,000 if we only consider donations made by the individuals when they were the
CEOs of S&P 500 firms. Considering donations made during the CEO tenure, on average,
the aggregate spending of the CEOs in each two-year election cycle is around 1.2 millions to
the Republican party and the Democratic party.
The trend in the polarization of politics, together with the frequency of political donations
made by individuals, makes political donations a potentially valid proxy for measuring the
political ideology of the donor. For individual donors, as previous studies have documented,
the ideology is a primary driver of the decision to donate (e.g.; Barber, 2016). However,
the nature of the CEO’s profession likely makes the CEO different from the general public.
As CEOs pursue strategic objectives for their firms, any donation made by a CEO may
be regarded as strategic or opportunistic giving rather than being a reflection of his or her
political ideology. In fact, the pattern in executives’ political giving has been shown to be
consistent with both ideological intents (Fremeth et al., 2013; Bonica, 2016) and strategic
considerations (Gordon, Hafer, and Landa, 2007; Richter and Werner, 2017). It is therefore
essential to construct a donation-based measure that reflects ideology rather than strategic
intent.
Another concern about using political contributions to measure ideology is dealing with
questions regarding the stability of the ideology across time. Even if a person’s political
donations serve as a true reflection of that person’s ideology, the assumption that ideology
remains constant over time needs to be scrutinized. This is due to the fact that one’s
ideology is likely determined by one’s income, age, education as well as other demographics,
which are subject to change over time. If ideology does not remain constant over time,
then considering the donations over time of CEOs causes bias in an aggregate time-invariant
measure of ideology. The bias is expected to be greater for CEOs whose donations are more
dispersed over time. We attempt to address the above two concerns in the following two
sub-sections.
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3.2.1. Consistency of Donation Patterns over Time
Even though basic demographic traits may be important determinants of political pref-
erences, we are less concerned about the fixed characteristics such as gender, ethnicity and
education when it comes to the study of CEOs. This is because the majority of CEOs in
our sample are highly educated, white males. Hence, we draw our attention to CEO age
and income, which are subject to change over time and also vary across firms. Nevertheless,
we expect the effect of income and age to be minimal as the CEOs are mostly senior (the
average age of CEOs in our sample is 57 years) and wealthy individuals. We use exploratory
analysis to check whether our expectation proves to be correct. The ExecuComp database
provides information about CEO age and compensation. By merging the ExecuComp data
with the donation data, we are able to determine the age and the cash compensation of the
CEO at the time of the donation. We use the CEO’s cash compensation as a proxy for the
CEO’s income and CEO share ownership as a proxy for CEO wealth.
Figure 1 presents three scatter plots illustrating the relationship between the fraction
of total donations given to the Republicans on the vertical axis and CEO age (Plot (a)),
the logarithm of one plus the CEO cash compensation (Plot(b)), and CEO share ownership
(Plot (c)), respectively, on the horizontal axis. The data points represent the combinations
of donations and age, combinations of donations and cash compensation, and combinations
of donations and share ownership at any given year. Plot (a) documents a low, yet significant
correlation (at the 5% level) between donations to the Republicans and CEO age (correla-
tion coefficient of 0.04), whereas Plot (b) shows a low and insignificant correlation between
donations to the Republicans and income (correlation coefficient of -0.02). Finally, Plot (c)
reports a low positive and insignificant correlation between donations to the Republicans
and CEO share ownership. This is partially consistent with the view that CEOs are mature
and wealthy individuals and that a greater number of them have right-leaning views.
————————————
Insert Fig. 1 about here.
————————————
Here, the association between CEO age and donations to the Republicans is minimal.
Yet, one might argue that there might still be time-varying factors that shape the donation
patterns over time and that we fail to account for in our analysis. For example, looking
at the CEOs of S&P 500 firms, Fremeth et al. (2013) note that the patterns of the direct
donations of an individual may change when the individual becomes the CEO of a large
corporation.4 Most prior studies use the life-time CEO donations to construct a political
4CEOs were found to intensify their donation activities for the period when they held their position as
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ideology measure. To be prudent, we consider the donations made by the CEO during
their tenure. This will help account for possible changes to CEO donations caused by time-
varying factors and unforeseen changes. Nevertheless, in the robustness section we consider
an alternative measure of political ideology, which is based on the donations of CEOs during
their life-time to date. The results do not change materially when using this alternative
measure.
3.2.2. Donations: Ideology versus Opportunism
Another relevant question about CEO political contributions is whether the donations are
the result of CEOs pursuing the objectives of their firm or a reflection of their own ideology.
Evidence suggests that, unlike corporate Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions,
the direct donations made by CEOs are more partisan, go to the non-incumbents, and are
less likely to target powerful legislators. As a result, it is highly likely that CEO donations
reflect CEO ideology (Bonica, 2016). In the same vein, the fact that CEO donations are
relatively small suggests that they are more likely a reflection of CEO political ideology
rather than money for favors. Nevertheless, there exists evidence supporting the competing
view that donations made by executives are strategic. For example, Gordon et al. (2007)
find support for the view that donations reflect strategic intent by documenting a positive
association between the level of CEO wealth linked to the firm and CEO donation activities.
Given the polarity of the findings, it is essential to examine this issue in more detail.
————————————
Insert Fig. 2 about here.
————————————
Figure 2 presents the frequency distribution of the fraction of dollars donated to the Re-
publicans by the CEOs in our sample. Similar to Bonica (2016), we find that the distribution
has fat tails, with large fractions of CEOs donating to one of the two parties only during
their tenure. This suggests that a considerable number of CEOs (i.e., 42%) are partisan
with a higher fraction of partisan CEOs making donations to the Republicans only (i.e.,
29%). However, there still remains a considerable fraction of bipartisan CEOs occupying
the middle of the frequency distribution and making donations to both parties during their
tenure. Tracking over time the proportion of CEOs who donate to both parties, we observe
that this proportion peaks around presidential elections and that it exceeds the proportion
of CEOs who remain loyal to the Democrats. This pattern emerges clearly from Figure 3.
CEO.
4In contrast to Figure 2, Figure 3 is based on the life-time donations of the S&P 500 CEOs rather than
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Devising additional exploratory tests, we find that despite not observing any association
between CEO compensation (and also share ownership) and donations to the Republican
and Democratic parties, CEOs who own a greater percentage of the shares of their firm are
more likely to donate to both parties.5 This finding, together with the findings in Figure
2 and Figure 3, confirms that, despite most CEOs being consistent over time with their
donation behavior, there still remains a group of CEOs acting opportunistically.
To make sure our measure of political ideology does not confound ideology with oppor-
tunism, we only consider a CEO to be liberal (conservative) if the CEO remains loyal to the
Democratic (Republican) party by contributing only to that party during his or her tenure.
CEOs who during their tenure donate to both parties are considered to be nonpartisan. In
addition, we distinguish liberal, conservative, and nonpartisan CEOs from CEOs who during
their tenure make no political donations. Put together, we differentiate between the follow-
ing four different categories of CEOs: 1) ZeroDonations, i.e., CEOs who during their tenure
make no donations to any political party; 2) NonPartisans, i.e., CEOs who during their
tenure make donations to both parties; 3) Conservatives, i.e., CEOs who remain loyal to
the Republicans by contributing only to the Republican party; and 4) Liberals, i.e., CEOs
who remain loyal to the Democrats by contributing only to the Democratic party.
In constructing our measure of CEO political ideology, we exclude the ZeroDonations
category as it is not possible to infer the political ideology of the CEOs in this category.
Thus, our measure of political ideology is composed of three indicator variables, based on
the three categories, i.e., Liberals, Conservatives and NonPartisans.
————————————
Insert Fig. 3 about here.
————————————
3.3. Dependent and Control Variables
We estimate the following baseline model:
Dividendit = α + βPolitical Ideologyi + γXit−1 + Industryi + Y eart + i (1)
Dividendit is the dependent variable. It is the dividend payout (common dividends over
net income) for firm i in year t (Dividend/NI). To check the robustness of our results, we also
their donations during their tenure as CEO of an S&P 500 firm as this enables us to cover the years before
1997.
5The average percentage of share ownership across the various categories of CEOs is reported in Table 1.
11
consider common dividends over beginning of the year total assets (Dividend/AT), common
dividends over sales (Dividend/Sales), the dividend yield, and the dividend per share.
Political Ideologyi is our key variable of interest. It measures the political preference
of the CEO of firm i over his/her tenure, and as mentioned earlier, comprises the following
three categories of CEOs: liberals, conservatives and nonpartisans.
Xit−1 is a vector of firm-level, board-level and CEO-level controls as described below.
Industryi is industry-fixed effects, based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes. Y eart represents year-fixed effects.
We include a number of firm-related controls commonly used in studies examining div-
idend payouts (e.g.; Chen, Leung, and Goergen, 2017). These include the following. Firm
size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Firm age is the number of years since the
firm first appeared in the CRSP database. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of assets
to the book value of assets. The market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets
plus the market value of common equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity
and deferred taxes. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt. Cash holdings
equal cash and marketable securities. Return on assets (ROA) is earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation, and amortization. Asset tangibility is net property, plant and equipment.
R&D spending is research and development expenses. As firms with missing R&D do not
have material R&D expenses in their 10-K reports, we replace the missing R&D values with
zero (e.g.; Brown and Petersen, 2011; He and Wintoki, 2016). We normalize leverage, cash
holdings, ROA, asset tangibility, and R&D by the beginning of year total assets. In order to
mitigate the potential effects of outliers, we winsorize the dependent variable and the afore-
mentioned control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Finally, when using common
dividends over net income as the measure for the dividend payout, we exclude observations
for years in which firms reported negative net income.
In addition, we control for a number of board-level and CEO-level variables. They
comprise board size, the fraction of independent directors on the board, an indicator variable
for CEO duality, CEO age, and CEO tenure. We also include CEO share ownership as a
control in our baseline regression but because there is a large number of missing values, we
exclude this from the rest of the analysis. Finally, we include Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s
(2009) E-index to measure board entrenchment. Year-fixed effects and industry-fixed effects
(based on the two-digit SIC codes) are included in all the regression models. The definitions
of all the variables are reported in the Appendix.
Additionally, we examine the likelihood of the firm being a dividend-paying firm given
its category of CEO. We estimate the following logit model:
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Prob(firm pays dividend) = f(Political Ideology)
The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is
a dividend-paying firm, and zero otherwise. The key independent variables are our three
indicator variables of CEO political ideology.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. CEO Political Ideology and Dividend Payout
Table 1 provides summary statistics and Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. Table
1 suggests that firms run by conservative CEOs pay significantly higher (at the 5% level or
better) dividends than firms run by liberal CEOs. This is the case for all five measures of the
dividend payout. In addition, firms run by liberal CEOs have a significantly greater Tobin’s
q, have greater cash holdings, invest more in R&D, but have lower asset tangibility and are
less likely to combine the posts of CEO and chairman of the board (all these differences are
significant at the 1% level). However, there is no statistically significant difference in the
ROA between firms with conservative and liberal CEOs.
————————————
Insert Table 1 about here.
————————————
————————————
Insert Table 2 about here.
————————————
Again, the main hypothesis of this paper is that liberal CEOs put less emphasis on
shareholders and therefore firms led by such CEOs pay lower dividends. While Table 1
suggested significantly higher dividends for firms run by conservative CEOs, we now conduct
a more thorough univariate analysis to investigate whether there is a relationship between
CEO political ideology and the dividend payout. Panel A of Table 3 reports the average
dividend payout (as measured by common dividends divided by net income) as well as the
fractions of non-dividend paying firms, those with dividend cuts, omissions, initiations, and
re-initiations for each year and for each of the three categories of CEOs (i.e., conservative,
liberal, and nonpartisan CEOs). The panel suggests that the dividend payout – as measured
by common dividends over net income – is greater in 13 out of 18 years for firms with
conservative CEOs compared to firms with liberal CEOs. In addition, while the proportion
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of non-payers peaked in the year 2003 (with a value of 0.397) for the firms with conservative
CEOs, it peaked much later, i.e., in the year 2007 (with a value of 0.923) for firms with
liberal CEOs.
Panel B presents the means for each of the aforementioned dividend measures for con-
servative and liberal CEOs over the entire period of 1997-2014. The last column in Panel
B reports the p-values for the t-tests (z-tests) that compare the differences in means (pro-
portions) between the two categories of CEOs. The mean dividend payout for firms with
conservative CEOs is significantly higher (at the 5% level) than the mean dividend payout
for firms with liberal CEOs. We also find that the proportion of firms with a conservative
CEO that do not pay a dividend is significantly lower (at the 1% level) than the equivalent
proportion for firms with a liberal CEO. However, we do not find any significant differences
in the proportions of firms cutting, omitting, initiating, and re-initiating their dividends
between the two categories of CEOs. Overall, these findings support our main hypothesis.
————————————
Insert Table 3 about here.
————————————
Table 4 contains the results from estimating our baseline regression models. The first
four columns of Table 4 report the results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
following the specification in Eq. 1 and explaining the dividend payout. These three columns
vary in terms of the number of control variables we include. In the first column, we do not
include any controls, except for the year- and industry-fixed effects. In the second column,
we add the firm-level controls. In the third column, we include all the controls. Finally,
in addition to all the controls in Column (3), Column (4) includes the percentage of the
firm’s shares outstanding held by its CEO. This is an important control variable, which we
include here but omit in the rest of analysis due to the large number of missing values for
this variable. Nevertheless, we obtain similar results if we use CEO share ownership in the
rest of the analysis.
Consistent with our main hypothesis, the coefficient on Liberals is negative and signifi-
cant (at the 1% level in the four columns, except in Column (4) where the significance level
is 5%), suggesting that firms led by liberal CEOs have lower dividend payouts compared to
firms led by conservative or nonpartisan CEOs.6 The effects of the control variables on the
likelihood of paying a dividend are in line with expectations. More specifically, larger firms,
6The analysis yields similar results when we only compare liberal CEOs to conservative CEOs (i.e., when
we drop observations for nonpartisan CEOs). Again, we find that firms led by liberal CEOs tend to have
lower dividend payouts than firms led by conservative CEOs.
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older firms and firms with better governance (as evidenced by greater board independence)
have higher dividend payouts.
In addition to the dividend payout, we explain the likelihood of the firm paying a dividend
across liberal, conservative, and nonpartisan CEOs (the latter being the base case). Again,
we argue that CEO political ideology determines the likelihood of a firm being a dividend
paying firm: A liberal CEO should be less likely to pay a dividend. Columns (5), (6), and
(7) in Table 4 present the results (i.e, the marginal effects for the logit regressions). Similar
to Columns (1) to (3), these columns only vary in terms of the number of control variables
included in the regression. The results lend support to our hypothesis that being a liberal
CEO increases the likelihood of the firm not being a dividend payer. The effects of the control
variables on the likelihood of the firm paying a dividend are in line with expectations. In
detail, more profitable firms (as measured by ROA), larger firms, older firms, firms with
lower cash holdings, and firms with less leverage are more likely to pay a dividend.
————————————
Insert Table 4 about here.
————————————
4.2. Dividend Payouts Around CEO Appointments
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms led by liberal CEOs have lower dividend
payouts and such firms are also less likely to pay a dividend. However, it may be the case
that liberal CEOs self-select themselves into firms that pay lower or no dividends. Hence,
we investigate changes in dividend payouts around the appointment of a new CEO. In other
words, if CEOs self-select themselves into firms with a specific dividend policy, we should
not observe changes in dividend policy following CEO appointments.
Specifically, we consider the firm-year observations one year before and one, two or three
years after the appointment. We only consider CEO appointments where the incumbent
and the new CEOs are classified as liberal or conservative. We then estimate the following
equation 2.
Dividenda+k −Dividenda−1 = α + βTreated+ γX + i , k = 1, 2, 3 (2)
The dependent variable is the change in dividends per share. Index a denotes the year
of the appointment. Treated, the explanatory variable of interest, takes the value of -1
for conservative-to-liberal CEO transitions, zero for conservative-to-conservative as well as
liberal-to-liberal transitions, and one for liberal-to-conservative transitions. The rationale
behind the coding of this variable is to distinguish between CEO appointments that result
15
in a change in political ideology and those that do not. For the former, we also control for the
hypothesized effect on the dividend payout (i.e., negative or positive). In total, we document
55 changes in CEO, including seven cases of conservative-to-liberal, eight cases of liberal-
to-conservative, 10 cases of liberal-to-liberal and 30 cases of conservative-to-conservative
transitions.
Following the spirit of Lintner (1956) (see also Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely,
2005), X represents the vector of control variables, including net income (normalized by the
lagged value of total assets) one year before the appointment, the change in net income (net
income one, two or three years after the appointment minus net income one year before the
appointment), and the dividend per share one and two years prior to the appointment.
Given the hypothesized focus on shareholders of conservative CEOs, we expect maximiz-
ing firm value to be the priority for such CEOs. As a result, we anticipate that conservative
CEOs, as compared to their liberal counterparts, pursue strategies that increase firm value
while possibly being detrimental to the employees of the firm. The divestment of inefficient
resources of a firm may positively affect firm value (Wright and Ferris, 1997). It may also
increase the amount of free cash flow available to the firm. In turn, this free cash flow could
be used to maintain or increase dividends. Therefore, whenever possible, asset divestments
and employee downsizing may be seen as a viable strategy by conservative CEOs given that
paying attention to the interests of their employees is not their number one priority. Previous
studies confirm that a shift from a stakeholder orientation toward a shareholder orientation
is a key determinant of asset divestitures and employee downsizing both at the country level
and the managerial level (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000;
Jung, 2014).
One instance where this change in firm strategy may manifest itself is when a firm
appoints a new CEO. This is because the newly appointed CEO finds a chance to imprint
his/her managerial style, and his/her managerial style may be substantially different from
that of the predecessor. In the context of this study, we are interested in transitions where a
liberal CEO is replaced by a conservative one (and vice-versa). Following such transitions, we
expect to see a change in strategy from what Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) call ‘retain and
reinvest’ where the firm chooses to retain both the capital and the employees, and reinvest
in physical capital and complementary human resources, to what they call ‘downsize and
distribute’ where the top management downsizes the corporation, with a particular emphasis
on cutting the size of the labor force, and in an attempt to increase the return on equity.
We speculate that conservative CEOs sustain their dividend payout using the proceeds
they raise by selling off inefficient physical assets and shedding labor. If true, the dividend
payout of firms, which replace their liberal CEO with a conservative one should be sensitive to
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downsizing and divestment. To test the validity of this argument, we estimate the following
two equations:
Dividenda+k −Dividenda−1 = α + β1Treated+ β2(Treated ∗Downsizing) + γX + i, k = 1, 2, 3
(3a)
Dividenda+k −Dividenda−1 = α + β1Treated+ β2(Treated ∗Divestment) + γX + i, k = 1, 2, 3
(3b)
The dependent variable is the change in the dividend per share. As above, Index a
denotes the year of the appointment. Treated takes the value of -1 for conservative-to-liberal
CEO transitions, zero for conservative-to-conservative transitions as well as liberal-to-liberal
transitions, and one for liberal-to-conservative transitions. Downsizing is the reduction in
the number of employees, which is measured as the number of employees one year before the
appointment, minus the number of employees one, two or three years after the appointment.
A positive value would signify downsizing while a negative value would be akin to an increase
in employment. Divestment is the reduction in the firm’s total assets measured as the
logarithm of one plus total assets one year before the appointment minus the logarithm of
one plus total assets one, two and three years after the appointment, respectively. Again, a
positive value would signify disinvestment.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 5 report the results of OLS regressions based on Eq. 2.
The dependent variable is the dividend per share one year (Column (1)), two years (Column
(2)), and three years (Column (3)) after the appointment minus the dividend per share one
year before the appointment.
In line with expectations, the results suggest that a conservative CEO replacing a liberal
CEO (Treated = 1) results in a significant increase in the dividend per share in the years
following the appointment. Interestingly, both the size and the significance level of the
Treated coefficient increase over the three years following the appointment, suggesting that
conservative CEOs increase the dividend even more as they find their place in the company.
Overall, the results lend support to our main hypothesis that the political preferences of the
CEO matter for dividend policy and the pattern we observe in the regressions is not merely
due to CEO-firm matching.
————————————
Insert Table 5 about here.
————————————
Columns (4), (5), and (6) in Table 5 report the results of OLS regressions based on Eq.
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3a, explaining the change in the dividend per share from one year prior to the new CEO
appointment to one, two, and three years after the appointment, respectively. Columns (7),
(8), and (9) in Table 5 follow a similar procedure, except that the regressions are based
on Eq. 3b. Again, employee downsizing is captured by the reduction in the number of
employees, which is measured as the number of employees one year before the appointment
minus the number of employees one year (Column (4)), two years (Column (5)) and three
years (Column (6)) after the appointment, respectively. Divestment is represented by the
change in the firm’s total assets measured as the logarithm of total assets one year before the
appointment minus the logarithm of total assets one year (Column (7)), two years (Column
(8)), and three years (Column (9)) after the appointment, respectively. Again, a positive
value for downsizing and divestment means a decrease in the number of employees and firm
assets, respectively.
The coefficient on the interaction between the replacement of the CEO and downsizing
(Treated * Downsizing) and the coefficient on the equivalent interaction with divestment
(Treated * Divestment) are positive and significant one year and two years (and also three
years for the case of downsizing) after the appointment (see Columns (4) to (9)). These
results are supportive of the argument that the increase in the dividend per share in the
case of a transition from a liberal to a conservative CEO goes hand in hand with downsizing
and divestment. In other words, there is evidence that the decision of conservative CEOs to
increase the dividend payout may come at the expense of the employees.7 Nevertheless, this
decision may still be in the interest of the shareholders. Hence, we explore this issue further
in the next sub-section.
4.3. Future Performance of Firms With Conservative and Liberal CEOs
The central argument in this paper is that CEO political ideology is a key determinant
of the degree of attention given by the CEO to investors relative to workers. What we
intend to investigate in this sub-section is whether liberal and conservative CEOs also differ
substantially when it comes to the firm’s future performance. Specifically, we ask whether
conservative CEOs’ focus on shareholders – potentially at the detriment of employees –
leads to a drop or increase in future performance. To attempt to answer this question, we
investigate whether the future performance and value of firms led by the conservative CEOs
are different from those of liberal and nonpartisan CEOs. We proceed by regressing ROA
and Tobin’s q in year t, respectively, on CEO political ideology in year t–1 as presented in
7Gupta, Nadkarni, and Mariam (2018b) also find that conservative CEOs are more likely to engage in
downsizing of their workforce.
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the following dynamic models:
ROAit = β1ROAit−1 + β2Political Ideologyi + γXit−1i (4a)
Tobin′s qit = β1Tobin′s qit−1 + β2Political Ideologyi + γXit−1i (4b)
ROAit and Tobin
′s qit are the dependent variables measuring the performance and the
value of firm i in year t, respectively. Both models contain the lagged dependent variable
on the right-hand side, hence presenting a dynamic equation. Political Ideologyi is the
political ideology of the CEO of firm i and X represents the vector of firm, CEO and board
level control variables. Omitting the intercept from the models allows the comparison to
be made between all the three ideology groups. Using Eq. 4a as the basis, we start by
estimating an OLS regression. In order to mitigate the potential effects of unobserved time-
invariant factors, we proceed by estimating a firm-fixed effects (FE) regression. Finally,
we run a system generalized method-of-moments (System GMM) regression to control for
possible omitted variable bias and to deal with the potential presence of dynamic endogeneity
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Wintoki, Linck, and Netter, 2012). Subsequently, we repeat the
same analysis using Eq. 4b.
The results are presented in Table 6. Column (1), (2), and (3) presents the results of the
OLS, FE and System GMM regression, respectively, estimated using Eq. 4a. As reported in
the first two columns, the large difference between the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable in the OLS regression (0.780) and the equivalent coefficient in the FE regression
(0.521) indicates that the OLS estimate is likely upward biased whereas the FE estimate is
likely downward biased (Bond, 2002). Further, the same coefficient is large and significant
in the System GMM regression (Column (3)), which is suggestive of the presence of dynamic
endogeneity.8
In the OLS and FE regressions (Columns (1) and (2)), the coefficient on CEO political
ideology is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) for liberals, conservatives
and nonpartisans: All three categories of CEOs seem to have a positive effect on firm perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, all three coefficients are of a similar magnitude. Importantly, further
tests (which are not tabulated) reveal that the coefficients on liberals, conservatives, and
nonpartisans for each of the two columns are not statistically different from each other. The
8We expect the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the System GMM
regression to be somewhere in between the lower bound formed by the equivalent FE estimate and the
higher bound formed by the equivalent OLS estimate (Bond, 2002). This is indeed the case.
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results from the System GMM regression, which are reported in Column (3), suggest that
the coefficients are insignificant for all the three categories of CEOs. This confirms that the
attention paid by conservative CEOs to the shareholders in the short run – via increases in
dividends – neither improves nor deteriorates future performance and firm value. In turn,
there is no evidence that firms with liberal CEOs underperform compared to firms with
conservative CEOs.
Columns (4) to (6) in Table 6 report the results of the aforementioned – OLS, FE and
System GMM, respectively – regressions using model 4b, explaining Tobin’s q. Similar to
the results from Columns (1) to (3), there is a large difference between the coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable in the OLS regression (0.754) and the equivalent coefficient in
the FE regression (0.546). The same coefficient is large and significant in the System GMM
regression (Column (6)), which is suggestive of the presence of dynamic endogeneity.9
The coefficients for conservative, liberal, and nonpartisan CEOs are all significant in
the OLS and FE regressions (Columns (4) and (5)). Again, all three coefficients are of a
similar magnitude. However, again we find that the coefficients for all three categories of
CEOs are not significantly different from each other both in the OLS and FE regression.
The result from the System GMM regression (Column (6)) are similar to the results for
the aforementioned System GMM regression reported in Column (3): The coefficients on
liberals, conservatives, and nonpartisans are all insignificant. Similar to the results for firm
performance, this suggests that the differences in dividend policy between the three categories
of CEOs do not result in differences in future firm value.
Extending the analysis, we run the same regressions replacing the dependent variables,
i.e., ROA and Tobin’s q in year t, with ROA and Tobin’s q in years t + 1 and t + 2. This
helps us to compare the performance of conservative, liberal, and nonpartisan CEOs over
the subsequent years. The results from these regressions – which we do not tabulate here –
remain the same as the ones we report in Table 6: The future performance and firm value
of firms with conservative CEOs remains similar to that of liberal and nonpartisan CEOs.
Overall, the results from this analysis can be used to draw conclusions about the validity
of the conjecture proposed in this sub-section: The decision of conservative CEOs to cater
to their shareholders by paying more dividends could potentially affect the firm’s future
performance and value. However, we find no significant difference in the future performance
and value of firms led by conservative, liberal, and nonpartisan CEOs, and hence, find no
support for this conjecture.
————————————
9Again and as expected, the System GMM coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is somewhere
between the lower FE estimate and the higher OLS estimate.
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Insert Table 6 about here.
————————————
4.4. Dividend Cuts, Omissions, Initiations, and Re-initiations
The main results so far suggest that firms with liberal CEOs are less likely to be divi-
dend payers and, if they pay dividends, they tend to pay lower dividends. Next, we examine
whether CEO political ideology determines the likelihood of dividend cuts, omissions, initi-
ations, and re-initiations. It can be argued that liberal CEOs are more likely to cut or omit
dividends and are less likely to initiate or re-initiate dividends. However, as a reminder, Panel
B of Table 3 documents no significant differences in the proportions of firms with dividend
cuts, omissions, initiations, and re-initiations between liberal and conservative CEOs.
We further investigate the existence of potential differences by running logit models,
for which we do not tabulate the results. We regress the binary variables indicating a
dividend cut, omission, initiation, and re-initiation on CEO political ideology controlling
for the set of control variables used in the previous regressions. The logit models help
us estimate differences in the likelihood of dividend cuts, omissions, initiations, and re-
initiations between liberal and conservative CEOs, controlling for firm-level, CEO-level, and
board-level characteristics. The results are similar to the results from Table 3: Liberal and
conservative CEOs tend not to be significantly different with respect to their propensity to
undertake such dividend changes.
The findings about omitting and cutting dividends are consistent with the Lintner (1956)
stylized fact about the stickiness of dividends (see also Brav et al., 2005). It seems that the
deterrent of being penalized for dividend cuts and omissions 10 is such that, regardless of
their political views, CEOs are extremely reluctant to reduce the level of dividends their
firm pays to the shareholders. In addition, firms have been shown to only (re-)initiate their
dividend if they believe it can be maintained in the long run (Brav et al., 2005). This may
explain why we do not see a substantial difference in dividend initiations and re-initiations
between conservative CEOs and liberal CEOs.
10Extant literature suggests the following penalties for reducing dividends and omitting dividends: negative
stock price reactions (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995; Jensen, Lundstrum,
and Miller, 2010), substantial reductions in institutional ownership (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003), an
increased likelihood of CEO dismissal (Parrino et al., 2003; Schaeck, Cihak, Maechler, and Stolz, 2011), and
fewer future external board seats for the top executives of the firms in question (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990).
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5. Robustness Analysis
We devise three tests to examine the robustness of the key results. First, we perform
propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to match firm-year observa-
tions with conservative CEOs with firm-year observations with liberal CEOs. PSM consists
of an alternative way of addressing the aforementioned possible self-selection of CEOs into
firms with specific characteristics, including a specific dividend policy, which may be more
in line with their political ideology. Second, we replace the dividend payout measure with
four alternative measures. Finally, we also use two alternative measures for CEO political
ideology.
5.1. Propensity Score Matching
As aforementioned, it might be the case that CEOs select the firm they want to work
for based on how well the firm’s characteristics are aligned with their own political ideology.
For example, liberal CEOs may prefer not to work for firms that have historically engaged
in substantial downsizing of their workforce or asset divestments. In contrast, conservative
CEOs may prefer to work for such firms. In the first step, we estimate a logit, which
predicts the probability that the firm has a conservative CEO in year t. This probability (or
propensity score) is obtained by estimating a logit regression with the same right-hand-side
variables (measured in year t-1) as the regression in Column (3) of Table 4, except that we
drop the indicator variables specifying the CEO’s political ideology. The dependent variable
of the logit equals one if the CEO is conservative, and zero if the CEO is liberal.11
The results from estimating this logit are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The table
suggests that the logit has good predictive power as reflected by a pseudo R-square of 0.30
(Column (1)). In the second step, we use the propensity score to match firm-year observations
with conservative CEOs with firm-year observations with liberal CEOs. To perform the
matching, we use nearest neighbor matching, with a caliper of 0.05%. We are able to match
195 firm-year observations with conservative CEOs with the equivalent number of firm-year
observations with liberal CEOs.
To ensure that the matching is of sufficient quality, we perform two tests. First, we
re-estimate the logit underlying the PSM using the post-match observations. The results of
this logit are reported in Column (2) of Panel A of Table 7. In contrast to the pre-match
logit, the post-match logit has little or no predictive power as reflected by the low pseudo
R-square (0.051) and the lack of significance of all of the explanatory variables.
11We exclude firm-year observations relating to nonpartisan CEOs.
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Second, Panel B of the same table compares the characteristics of firm-year observations
with conservative CEOs with those firm-year observations with liberal CEOs. All of the
differences in means are insignificant (the lowest p-value being 0.14), confirming the quality
of the matching.
Finally, Panel C reports the propensity score matching estimates. The results suggest
that following the PSM, there are still significant differences in the dividend payout (this is
the case for all five measures of the dividend payout) between firm-year observations with
conservative CEOs and those with liberal CEOs. This test provides further support for our
main hypothesis.
————————————
Insert Table 7 about here.
————————————
5.2. Alternative Dividend Payout Measures
We replace the main dividend payout measure (common dividends over net income) with
dividends over beginning of the year total assets, dividends over total sales, the dividend yield
and dividends per share in the baseline model. The results are reported in Table 8. The
coefficient on the Liberals category of CEO is still negative and significant (at the 1% level,
except for Columns (9) and (12)), regardless of the way we measure the dividend payout
and regardless of the set of control variables we include. All of the regressions confirm our
existing results: The dividend paid by firms led by liberal CEOs is less than the dividend
paid by firms led by conservative and nonpartisan CEOs.
————————————
Insert Table 8 about here.
————————————
5.3. Alternative Measures of Political Ideology
We introduce two alternative ways of measuring the political ideology of the CEO. One
commonly used donation-based measure of political ideology in extant literature is the frac-
tion of total donations given to the Democratic (Republican) party to measure liberalism
(conservatism).12 Even though useful, the problem with this measure as Figure 3 suggests is
that the number of CEOs donating to both parties peaks just before presidential elections,
suggesting that some CEOs donate strategically. These strategic donations may affect the
12See e.g.; Elnahas and Kim (2017); Unsal et al. (2016); Chin et al. (2013).
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way we measure ideology. Yet, the aforementioned approach for measuring political ideology
does not provide a remedy for mitigating the potential effects of strategic donations. To
overcome this obstacle, we only consider CEOs who had at least one donation during their
tenure (i.e., the years during which we observe the CEOs in our sample). In addition, using
the insights from Figure 3, we remove the donations made one year before the presidential
election and construct the following alternative measure of CEO ideology (CEO liberalism):
CEO Liberalism =
Total amount donated to Democratic party during tenure
Total amount donated to Republican party and Democratic party during tenure
This measure potentially ranges from zero (indicating a purely conservative CEO) to one
(indicating a purely liberal CEO). We replace our main measure of CEO political ideology
in Eq. 1 with this new measure of CEO liberalism and re-run the analysis. The results are
reported in Table 9. CEO liberalism is still negatively associated with the dividend payout
regardless of the dividend payout measure that is used. Hence, our main results are upheld.
————————————
Insert Table 9 about here.
————————————
Finally, instead of focusing on the political donations made by the CEOs during their
tenure as an S&P 500 CEO we take into account all the donations that each CEO has
made during their life-time to date. We then recalculate our measure of political ideology
and then reclassify CEOs as conservative, liberal, and nonpartisan. Our key results do not
change qualitatively when considering life-time donations.13
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This research provides evidence that the political ideology of the CEO affects dividend
policy. We find strong as well as consistent support across a range of tests for our hypothesis
that liberal CEOs pay lower dividends to their shareholders. The cornerstone of our analysis
is built upon the view that CEOs may have different attitudes toward the firms stakehold-
ers and these differences are likely to shape the firm’s policies. In particular, this study
investigates CEO political ideology as a determinant of the attention the CEO accords to
the firm’s various stakeholders. More precisely, liberal CEOs are likely to pay less attention
13These results are not tabulated, but are available from the authors upon request.
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to the shareholders as compared to other stakeholders – such as the employees – and they
reveal their preferences when setting their firm’s dividend policy.
This study has two important implications for investors and other corporate stakeholders.
First, it suggests that CEOs may treat the firm’s stakeholders differently by prioritizing the
interests of the shareholders over those of employees, and vice-versa. This may result in
the CEO framing strategies and making policy decisions that may or may not result in
increased shareholder wealth. For the case of conservative CEOs, one might expect that
their decisions are more likely to favor shareholders and increase the latter’s wealth in the
short run if not the long run. Second, CEO values (i.e., political ideology in this study)
may be a determinant of CEO and firm performance as well as managerial style. While the
observable characteristics of a CEO, such as education and work experience, are normally
used to infer the ability and the managerial style of the CEO, this research sheds light onto
how the political leaning of a CEO affects corporate policy. Hence, potential investors and
employees of a firm may use the CEO’s political ideology as a determinant of the CEO’s
managerial style.
This paper provides empirical evidence on how the CEO’s political ideology determines
whether the CEO prioritizes investors over employees, or the converse. One area for further
research is the study of the dynamics between the CEOs self-interest, his attention to the
firms stakeholders and the consequences for corporate policies. Specific to the context of this
study, further research may also explore differences in the use of stock repurchases between
conservative and liberal CEOs. Further, this study finds no significant differences between
conservative and liberal CEOs with respect to their propensity to cut, omit, initiate, and re-
initiate the dividend; we relate these findings to the rigidity and the stickiness of dividends.
Last but not least, we do not find any evidence that a specific type of CEO political ideology
affects future firm value and firm performance more than any other type of CEO political
ideology.
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Appendix The Definition of Variables
Dividend Measures
• Dividend/NI: Dividends on common stock over net income (Compustat: dvc / ni).
• Dividend/TA: Dividends on common stock over beginning of the year total assets. This
variable is only calculated for firm-year observations with positive net income (Compustat:
dvc / lag of at).
• Dividend/Sales: Dividends on common stock over total sales (Compustat: dvc / sale).
• Dividend yield: Dividend per share over the fiscal year-end share price (Compustat:
dvpsp f / prcc f).
• Dividend per share: Dividend per share (Compustat: dvpsp f).
• Dividend cut: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm has reduced its
dividend compared to the previous year, and zero otherwise (data from Compustat).
• Dividend omission: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm paid a div-
idend previously, but no longer pays a dividend in the year in question, and zero otherwise
(data from Compustat).
• Dividend initiation: An indicator variable taking the value of one for the year when the
firm has paid a dividend for the first time since its inclusion in the CRSP database. It is set
to zero for the years before the dividend initiation and set to missing for the years after the
dividend initiation (data from Compustat and CRSP).
• Dividend re-initiation: An indicator variable taking the value of one for the first year
when the firm re-initiates its dividend after a dividend omission. It is set to zero, for the
years following the year of the dividend omission when the dividend remains at zero. It is
set to missing for all other years (data from Compustat).
• Dividend-paying firm: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is a
dividend-paying firm, and zero otherwise (data from Compustat).
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Political Ideology
• Political ideology (CEO types): A set of indicator variables based on the following three
categories of CEOs:
1. Conservatives: An indicator variable taking the value of one for CEOs whose contri-
bution during their tenure was to the Republican party only, and zero otherwise (data
from Federal Election Commission (FEC)).
2. Liberals: An indicator variable taking the value of one for CEOs whose contribution
during their tenure was to the Democratic party only, and zero otherwise (data from
FEC).
3. NonPartisans: An indicator variable taking the value of one for CEOs whose con-
tribution during their tenure was to both the Democratic and Republican parties, and
zero otherwise (data from FEC).
• CEO liberalism: Considering all the donations made by a CEO in the years during which
we observe the CEO in our sample but excluding the donations made one year before the
U.S. presidential elections, CEO liberalism is measured as the total amount donated to the
Democratic party divided by the sum of the total amounts donated to the Republican party
and Democratic party (data from FEC).
Control Variables
• Firm size: Logarithm of total assets (Compustat: log(at)).
• Firm age: This is calculated based on the year when the firm first appeared in the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. As firm age is highly correlated with the
main measure of political ideology, we regressed firm age on political ideology and replaced
its value with the residuals obtained from this regression (data from CRSP).
• Tobin’s q: The market value of assets plus the book value of debt divided by the book value
of assets. The market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets plus the market
value of common equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and deferred
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taxes. (Compustat: ((at + mequity) - (ceq + txdb)) / at).
• ROA: Return on assets measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amor-
tization (EBIDTA) divided by beginning of year total assets (Compustat: ebitda / lag of at).
• Asset tangibility: Net property, plant and equipment divided by beginning of year total
assets. (Compustat: ppent / lag of at).
• Cash holdings: The sum of cash and marketable securities divided by the sum of beginning
of year total assets minus cash and marketable securities (Compustat: (che + msa) / (lag of
at - (che + msa))).
• Leverage: The sum of short-term and long-term debts over beginning of year total assets
(Compustat: (dltt + dlc) / lag of at ).
• R&D: Research and development expenditure divided by beginning of year total assets
(Compustat: xrd/ lag of at).
• Board size: The total number of directors on the board (data from RiskMetrics).
• Board independence: The ratio of independent directors on the board (RiskMetrics: In-
dependent directors / total number of directors).
• CEO duality: An indicator variable taking the value of one if the CEO is the chairman,
and zero otherwise (data from ExecuComp).
• CEO age: CEO age as reported in ExecuComp.
• CEO tenure: The number of years the CEO has been with the firm as the CEO (data from
Compustat).
• E-Index: The measure of board entrenchment developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). The
index takes a value between 0 to 6, counting the number of six anti-takeover provisions in
place. A higher value suggests a more entrenched board or lower shareholder rights (data
from Bebchuk et al. (2009)).
• CEO share ownership: The percentage of the firm’s shares outstanding owned by the
CEO (ExecuComp: shrown excl opts pct).
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• Downsizing: The reduction in the number of employees, which is measured as the number
of employees one year before the appointment of a new CEO minus the number of employees
one, two or three years after the appointment. (Compustat:
empone year before the appointment − empone, two or three years after the appointment).
• Divestment: The reduction in the firm’s total assets measured as the logarithm of one plus
total assets one year before the appointment of a new CEO minus the logarithm of one plus
total assets one, two or three years after the appointment. (Compustat:
log(1 + atone year before the appointment) − log(1 + atone, two or three years after the appointment)).
• Industry: The industries are based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes (data from Compustat).
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Figure 2
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This plot presents the distribution of the fraction of total donations made by the CEOs during their tenure as CEO of an
S&P 500 firm to the Republican party. A value of zero on the X-axis corresponds to the CEOs who only contributed to
the Democratic party. A value of one on the X-axis relates to the CEOs who only made donations to the Republican party.
Values of more than zero and less than one correspond to the CEOs who made donations to both the Democratic and the
Republican parties.
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Figure 3
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This figure presents the fraction of the total life-time donations made by the CEOs of S&P 500 firms to the Republicans,
Liberals and both parties. The distance between each adjacent pair of dashed vertical lines presents a four-year presidency
period. The periods marked by blue (red) indicate a period with a Democratic (Republican) president in office.
39
T
a
b
le
1
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
C
E
O
s
w
it
h
d
iff
er
en
t
p
ol
it
ic
al
id
eo
lo
gi
es
.
W
h
ol
e
S
am
p
le
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
es
L
ib
er
al
s
N
on
P
ar
ti
sa
n
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
n
am
e
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
S
D
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
S
D
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
S
D
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
S
D
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
0.
34
5
0.
24
4
0.
47
4
0.
30
8
0.
22
5
0.
47
6
0.
26
3*
*
0.
14
0
0.
47
4
0.
38
3
0.
27
3
0.
47
4
D
iv
id
en
d
/T
A
0.
01
8
0.
01
1
3.
27
8
0.
01
9
0.
01
2
3.
12
2
0.
01
4*
**
0.
00
6
3.
27
8
0.
01
8
0.
01
2
3.
27
8
D
iv
id
en
d
/S
al
es
0.
02
9
0.
01
7
0.
15
8
0.
02
6
0.
01
5
0.
15
8
0.
02
0*
**
0.
00
6
0.
15
8
0.
03
2
0.
02
0
0.
15
8
D
iv
id
en
d
y
ie
ld
0.
01
7
0.
01
4
6.
33
7
0.
01
6
0.
01
2
5.
92
1
0.
01
3*
**
0.
00
7
6.
33
7
0.
01
9
0.
01
5
6.
33
7
D
iv
id
en
d
p
er
sh
ar
e
0.
77
1
0.
58
2
2.
57
2
0.
70
9
0.
50
0
2.
71
0
0.
58
2*
**
0.
21
8
2.
57
2
0.
84
5
0.
69
0
2.
57
2
T
ob
in
’s
q
2.
10
0
1.
60
3
0.
03
9
2.
19
2
1.
74
9
0.
03
5
2.
49
9*
**
1.
79
8
0.
03
9
1.
95
8
1.
44
9
0.
03
9
R
O
A
0.
16
7
0.
15
4
17
.9
80
0.
18
4
0.
17
5
17
.6
55
0.
17
8
0.
15
5
17
.9
80
0.
15
6
0.
14
4
17
.9
80
F
ir
m
si
ze
9.
39
3
9.
35
5
0.
07
7
8.
96
1
8.
85
9
0.
07
4
8.
95
7
8.
77
8
0.
07
7
9.
70
5
9.
66
2
0.
07
7
F
ir
m
ag
e
33
.6
90
36
0.
79
7
31
.6
50
32
0.
76
2
29
.2
30
23
0.
79
7
35
.7
00
39
0.
79
7
C
as
h
h
ol
d
in
gs
0.
12
5
0.
06
6
1.
52
1
0.
10
1
0.
05
2
1.
46
8
0.
19
5*
**
0.
10
9
1.
52
1
0.
12
2
0.
06
9
1.
52
1
L
ev
er
ag
e
0.
27
8
0.
25
3
1.
47
4
0.
27
2
0.
24
6
1.
40
3
0.
26
1
0.
22
9
1.
47
4
0.
28
5
0.
25
8
1.
47
4
R
&
D
0.
02
0
0
0.
04
4
0.
01
5
0
0.
03
3
0.
03
2*
**
0
0.
04
4
0.
02
1
0
0.
04
4
A
ss
et
ta
n
gi
b
il
it
y
0.
31
6
0.
23
0
0.
27
8
0.
33
4
0.
24
0
0.
28
2
0.
26
8*
**
0.
19
9
0.
27
8
0.
31
7
0.
22
9
0.
27
8
B
oa
rd
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
0.
74
1
0.
77
8
1.
46
1
0.
73
5
0.
77
8
1.
55
9
0.
73
5
0.
77
8
1.
46
1
0.
74
6
0.
78
6
1.
46
1
B
oa
rd
si
ze
10
.8
00
11
0.
16
0
10
.4
90
10
0.
13
5
10
.3
20
10
0.
16
0
11
.0
80
11
0.
16
0
C
E
O
d
u
al
it
y
0.
66
0
1
0.
20
1
0.
65
3
1
0.
19
6
0.
54
0*
**
1
0.
20
1
0.
69
1
1
0.
20
1
C
E
O
ag
e
56
.2
80
56
0.
45
5
56
.7
80
57
0.
39
2
55
.6
20
**
*
55
0.
45
5
56
.1
80
56
0.
45
5
C
E
O
te
n
u
re
4.
84
9
4
0.
02
0
4.
58
3
4
0.
02
1
4.
50
7
4
0.
02
0
5.
05
8
4
0.
02
0
E
-i
n
d
ex
2.
72
8
3
0.
01
8
2.
84
7
3
0.
01
7
2.
75
1*
*
3
0.
01
8
2.
66
2
3
0.
01
8
C
E
O
sh
ar
e
ow
n
er
sh
ip
2.
81
9
0.
34
7
5.
77
1
2.
27
4
0.
32
9
4.
85
6
1.
44
6
0.
29
4
5.
77
1
3.
44
7
0.
37
8
5.
77
1
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
su
m
m
a
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
w
h
o
le
sa
m
p
le
a
n
d
th
e
su
b
-s
a
m
p
le
s
o
f
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e,
li
b
er
a
l,
a
n
d
n
o
n
p
a
rt
is
a
n
C
E
O
s.
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
d
en
o
te
th
e
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
o
f
th
e
t-
te
st
co
m
p
a
ri
n
g
th
e
m
ea
n
d
iff
er
en
ce
s
fo
r
ea
ch
v
a
ri
a
b
le
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
li
b
er
a
l
a
n
d
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
C
E
O
s
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
h
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
co
n
ta
in
s
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s
o
f
a
ll
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
40
T
a
b
le
2
:
C
or
re
la
ti
on
m
at
ri
x
.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1.
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
1
2.
D
iv
id
en
d
/T
A
0
.4
4
1
3.
D
iv
id
en
d
/S
al
es
0
.5
7
0
.6
6
1
4.
D
iv
id
en
d
y
ie
ld
0
.6
7
0
.4
9
0
.6
3
1
5.
D
iv
id
en
d
p
er
sh
ar
e
0
.5
4
0
.5
5
0
.6
2
0
.7
5
1
6.
T
ob
in
’s
q
-0
.2
0
0
.1
9
-0
.0
4
-0
.3
1
-0
.2
4
1
7.
R
O
A
-0
.1
7
0
.2
9
-0
.0
4
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
1
0
.6
2
1
8.
F
ir
m
si
ze
0
.2
1
-0
.0
2
0
.2
3
0
.3
2
0
.3
3
-0
.4
1
-0
.3
7
1
9.
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.2
6
0
.2
5
0
.1
6
0
.3
4
0
.3
3
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
1
0
.2
8
1
10
.C
as
h
h
ol
d
in
gs
-0
.2
2
-0
.0
6
-0
.1
0
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
7
0
.5
4
0
.2
9
-0
.2
2
-0
.3
2
1
11
.L
ev
er
ag
e
0
.2
2
-0
.0
1
0
.1
1
0
.2
1
0
.1
3
-0
.3
1
-0
.0
9
0
.0
6
0
.0
7
-0
.2
8
1
12
.R
&
D
-0
.1
3
0.
01
-0
.0
8
-0
.1
9
-0
.1
9
0
.4
1
0
.2
2
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
8
0
.5
5
-0
.1
7
1
13
.A
ss
et
ta
n
gi
b
il
it
y
0
.1
5
0
.0
5
0
.0
4
0
.1
3
0
.0
9
-0
.2
1
0
.1
2
-0
.0
9
0
.1
2
-0
.3
3
0
.3
0
-0
.1
9
1
14
.B
oa
rd
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
0
.1
5
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.2
1
0
.2
1
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
8
0
.2
8
0
.3
0
-0
.0
5
0.
02
0
.0
6
0.
01
1
15
.B
oa
rd
si
ze
0
.2
0
0
.0
9
0
.2
0
0
.3
0
0
.3
2
-0
.2
6
-0
.2
2
0
.5
6
0
.3
1
-0
.2
8
0
.0
6
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
4
0
.1
0
1
16
.C
E
O
d
u
al
it
y
0
.0
9
0
.0
7
0
.0
6
0
.1
1
0
.1
6
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
8
0
.1
2
0
.2
0
-0
.1
7
0
.0
6
-0
.0
5
0
.0
9
0
.1
6
0
.0
7
1
17
.C
E
O
ag
e
0
.0
8
0
.0
5
0
.0
7
0
.0
9
0
.1
0
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
3
0
.1
3
0
.1
2
-0
.1
0
0
.0
3
-0
.1
1
0
.1
2
0.
02
0
.0
7
0
.2
3
1
18
.C
E
O
te
n
u
re
0.
02
0
.0
3
0.
02
0.
02
0
.0
8
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
1
0
.1
2
0
.1
0
0
.0
3
-0
.0
6
0.
01
-0
.0
4
0
.1
8
-0
.0
3
0
.1
7
0
.3
2
1
19
.E
-i
n
d
ex
0
.0
4
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
0
.0
5
0
.0
7
-0
.1
7
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
0
.0
8
-0
.0
6
0.
02
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
0
.3
6
-0
.0
5
0.
00
0.
00
0
.1
9
1
20
.C
E
O
sh
ar
e
ow
n
er
sh
ip
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
0
.1
4
0
.1
1
-0
.1
1
-0
.2
1
0
.1
0
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
0.
03
-0
.3
7
-0
.1
1
0.
03
0
.1
6
0.
01
-0
.2
5
1
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
P
ea
rs
o
n
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
T
h
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
co
n
ta
in
s
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
a
ll
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
N
u
m
b
er
s
in
b
o
ld
in
d
ic
a
te
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
th
a
t
a
re
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
ll
y
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
o
r
b
et
te
r.
41
T
a
b
le
3
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
d
iv
id
en
d
m
ea
su
re
s.
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
M
e
a
n
s
o
f
v
a
ri
o
u
s
d
iv
id
e
n
d
m
e
a
su
re
s
fo
r
e
a
ch
y
e
a
r
fo
r
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
,
li
b
e
ra
l
a
n
d
n
o
n
p
a
rt
is
a
n
C
E
O
s.
C
lu
st
er
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
O
ve
ra
ll
P
er
io
d
1
L
ib
er
al
s
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
0.
24
7
0.
30
0
0.
26
9
0.
22
9
0.
32
0
0.
35
3
0.
25
5
0.
35
0
0.
17
8
0.
27
1
0.
17
2
0.
21
3
0.
25
0
0.
22
3
0.
23
6
0.
26
3
0.
37
4
0.
34
2
0.
26
3
2
N
on
-p
ay
er
s
−
0.
64
3
0.
64
7
0.
76
2
0.
61
5
0.
57
7
0.
72
0
0.
78
3
0.
76
9
0.
88
5
0.
92
3
0.
80
0
0.
84
6
0.
72
4
0.
60
0
0.
32
4
0.
27
8
0.
06
1
0.
63
6
3
D
iv
id
en
d
cu
t
−
0.
50
0
0.
69
2
0.
16
7
0.
28
0
0.
16
7
0.
13
6
0.
15
0
0
0.
08
3
0.
21
7
0.
04
2
0.
20
0
0.
08
7
0.
07
4
0.
06
7
0.
03
3
0.
03
2
0.
15
4
4
D
iv
id
en
d
om
is
si
on
−
0
0
0.
04
8
0
0
0.
04
0
0.
04
5
0
0.
04
2
0.
04
2
0
0
0.
03
6
0
0
0
0
0.
01
4
5
D
iv
id
en
d
in
it
ia
ti
on
−
0
0
0
0.
08
3
0
0.
08
3
0.
14
3
0
0
0
0
0.
05
0
0.
11
1
0
0.
15
4
0.
11
1
0
0.
04
7
6
D
iv
id
en
d
re
-i
n
it
ia
ti
on
−
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
25
0
0.
16
7
0.
40
0
0
0
0
0.
40
0
0.
40
0
0
0
0.
12
9
7
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
es
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
0.
24
0
0.
28
0
0.
39
8
0.
28
1
0.
39
9
0.
29
8
0.
21
1
0.
23
7
0.
23
5
0.
27
6
0.
27
0
0.
30
5
0.
38
0
0.
33
7
0.
29
9
0.
35
9
0.
37
9
0.
43
4
0.
30
8
8
N
on
-p
ay
er
s
−
0.
32
7
0.
35
9
0.
35
2
0.
34
7
0.
38
5
0.
39
7
0.
34
7
0.
30
6
0.
28
6
0.
27
3
0.
30
4
0.
30
7
0.
31
5
0.
29
5
0.
23
5
0.
16
2
0.
02
8
0.
30
9
9
D
iv
id
en
d
cu
t
−
0.
57
9
0.
34
1
0.
19
6
0.
20
3
0.
16
9
0.
09
5
0.
13
4
0.
11
5
0.
13
1
0.
25
4
0.
17
6
0.
21
9
0.
21
7
0.
09
2
0.
02
7
0.
21
9
0.
01
8
0.
19
1
10
D
iv
id
en
d
om
is
si
on
−
0
0
0.
02
9
0.
01
4
0.
01
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
01
4
0.
04
1
0
0
0.
01
3
0
0.
00
8
11
D
iv
id
en
d
in
it
ia
ti
on
−
0.
11
1
0
0.
07
1
0
0
0.
05
6
0.
05
0
0.
11
1
0.
06
2
0.
06
2
0.
05
6
0
0.
16
7
0
0.
06
7
0
0
0.
05
4
12
D
iv
id
en
d
re
-i
n
it
ia
ti
on
−
0
0
0
0
0
0.
09
1
0.
11
1
0
0.
16
7
0
0
0
0
0.
20
0
0.
37
5
0
0.
50
0
0.
07
1
13
N
on
P
ar
ti
sa
n
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
0.
37
0
0.
31
9
0.
33
6
0.
40
9
0.
34
8
0.
34
2
0.
36
4
0.
27
6
0.
29
6
0.
33
8
0.
31
7
0.
39
8
0.
50
8
0.
42
9
0.
44
3
0.
56
2
0.
42
5
0.
43
5
0.
38
3
14
N
on
-p
ay
er
s
−
0.
29
5
0.
30
9
0.
30
4
0.
31
6
0.
31
9
0.
27
4
0.
24
5
0.
20
6
0.
23
2
0.
24
0
0.
22
7
0.
23
3
0.
23
3
0.
17
5
0.
14
9
0.
11
9
0.
04
7
0.
23
4
15
D
iv
id
en
d
cu
t
−
0.
44
6
0.
39
5
0.
28
9
0.
20
4
0.
12
8
0.
09
9
0.
10
1
0.
16
4
0.
15
8
0.
18
0
0.
11
5
0.
29
2
0.
21
5
0.
07
1
0.
05
2
0.
14
7
0.
03
3
0.
17
9
16
D
iv
id
en
d
om
is
si
on
−
0.
01
1
0.
01
8
0.
00
8
0.
01
5
0.
02
2
0.
01
4
0
0
0.
00
6
0.
01
2
0.
02
2
0.
01
7
0.
01
1
0
0
0
0
0.
00
9
17
D
iv
id
en
d
in
it
ia
ti
on
−
0
0.
04
8
0
0.
03
2
0.
09
1
0.
12
9
0.
15
4
0.
03
8
0.
04
2
0.
03
6
0.
06
9
0.
03
6
0.
07
1
0.
25
0
0.
05
6
0.
12
5
0
0.
07
1
18
D
iv
id
en
d
re
-i
n
it
ia
ti
on
−
0.
16
7
0.
50
0
0
0
0
0.
44
4
0.
08
3
0
0.
10
0
0.
11
1
0.
27
3
0.
10
0
0.
18
2
0.
46
2
0
0.
50
0
0
0.
18
1
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
19
5
21
0
25
4
25
5
25
3
25
0
28
4
29
9
29
0
31
3
30
4
27
8
28
5
32
0
31
3
27
4
26
1
11
1
4,
74
9
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
M
e
a
n
s
fo
r
e
a
ch
o
f
th
e
d
iv
id
e
n
d
m
e
a
su
re
s
fo
r
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
a
n
d
li
b
e
ra
l
C
E
O
s
fo
r
1
9
9
7
-2
0
1
4
.
V
ar
ia
b
le
L
ib
er
al
s
C
on
se
rv
at
iv
es
D
iff
er
en
ce
in
M
ea
n
s
/
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
s
D
iv
id
en
d
/N
I
0.
26
3
0.
30
8
-0
.0
45
∗∗
N
on
-p
ay
er
s
0.
63
6
0.
30
9
0.
32
7∗
∗∗
D
iv
id
en
d
cu
t
0.
15
4
0.
19
1
-0
.0
37
D
iv
id
en
d
om
is
si
on
0.
01
4
0.
00
8
0.
00
6
D
iv
id
en
d
in
it
ia
ti
on
0.
04
7
0.
05
4
-0
.0
08
D
iv
id
en
d
re
-i
n
it
ia
ti
on
0.
12
9
0.
07
1
0.
05
8
P
a
n
el
A
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
m
ea
n
s
a
n
d
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
v
a
ri
o
u
s
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
o
li
cy
fo
r
ea
ch
y
ea
r
fo
r
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e,
li
b
er
a
l,
a
n
d
n
o
n
p
a
rt
is
a
n
C
E
O
s.
D
iv
id
en
d
/
N
I
is
th
e
m
ea
n
v
a
lu
e
o
f
co
m
m
o
n
d
iv
id
en
d
s
o
v
er
n
et
in
co
m
e.
N
o
n
-p
a
y
er
s
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
fi
rm
s.
D
iv
id
en
d
cu
t
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s
th
a
t
re
d
u
ce
th
ei
r
d
iv
id
en
d
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s.
O
m
is
si
o
n
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s
th
a
t
st
o
p
p
a
y
in
g
a
d
iv
id
en
d
in
a
n
y
y
ea
r
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s.
In
it
ia
ti
o
n
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s
th
a
t
h
a
v
e
st
a
rt
ed
p
a
y
in
g
a
d
iv
id
en
d
fo
r
th
e
fi
rs
t
ti
m
e
si
n
ce
th
ei
r
a
p
p
ea
ra
n
ce
in
th
e
C
R
S
P
d
a
ta
b
a
se
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-d
iv
id
en
d
p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s
in
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
y
ea
r.
R
e-
in
it
ia
ti
o
n
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
fi
rm
s
th
a
t
st
a
rt
p
a
y
in
g
a
d
iv
id
en
d
a
ft
er
o
m
it
ti
n
g
th
ei
r
d
iv
id
en
d
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-p
a
y
in
g
fi
rm
s,
w
h
ic
h
p
a
id
a
d
iv
id
en
d
in
th
e
p
a
st
.
P
a
n
el
B
co
m
p
a
re
s
th
e
m
ea
n
s
(f
o
r
D
iv
id
en
d
/
N
I)
a
n
d
th
e
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s
(f
o
r
th
e
re
st
o
f
th
e
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
d
iv
id
en
d
p
o
li
cy
)
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
a
n
d
li
b
er
a
l
C
E
O
s
o
v
er
th
e
en
ti
re
p
er
io
d
o
f
1
9
9
7
-2
0
1
4
.
T
h
e
a
st
er
is
k
s
in
th
e
th
ir
d
co
lu
m
n
d
en
o
te
th
e
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
o
f
th
e
Z
-t
es
ts
(f
o
r
th
e
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s)
a
n
d
th
e
t-
te
st
(f
o
r
D
iv
id
en
d
/
N
I)
.
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
5
%
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
42
Table 4: CEO political ideology, dividend payout and likelihood of being a dividend payer.
Models OLS Logit
Dependent Variable Dividend/NI Dividend-paying firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.365∗∗∗ 0.129 0.117 −0.035 0.174∗∗ −0.113∗ −0.084∗
(0.056) (0.145) (0.225) (0.241) (0.828) (1.697) (2.214)
Liberals −0.116∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.039) (0.285) (0.420) (0.474)
Conservatives −0.029 −0.039∗ −0.017 −0.035 −0.011 −0.011 0.000
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031) (0.261) (0.326) (0.371)
Tobin’s qt−1 −0.010 −0.011 −0.012 −0.006 −0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.123) (0.120)
ROAt−1 −0.075 −0.188 −0.077 0.279∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.175) (0.211) (1.840) (1.934)
Firm sizet−1 0.033∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.139) (0.165)
Firm aget−1 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011)
Cash holdingst−1 −0.142∗ −0.145 −0.046 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.102) (0.117) (0.923) (1.213)
Leveraget−1 0.109 0.063 0.032 −0.087∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.100) (0.080) (0.843) (0.964)
R&Dt−1 −0.125 −0.070 0.061 −0.268 −0.098
(0.214) (0.269) (0.443) (4.533) (4.201)
Asset tangibilityt−1 0.079 0.059 0.114 0.035 0.011
(0.100) (0.117) (0.089) (1.282) (1.486)
Board independencet−1 0.181∗ 0.190∗ 0.023
(0.096) (0.114) (1.171)
Board sizet−1 0.011∗ 0.008 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.084)
CEO dualityt−1 −0.025 −0.049∗ 0.010∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.254)
CEO aget−1 −0.002 −0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.028)
CEO tenuret−1 0.006 0.006 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.050)
E-Indext−1 −0.007 −0.010 0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.123)
CEO share ownershipt−1 −0.001
(0.003)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.237 0.264 0.299 0.350
Num. obs. 4757 3421 2302 1359 5685 3815 2544
F statistic 19.125 14.941 11.121 8.265
AIC 4737.041 2323.219 1451.215
BIC 5248.751 2829.202 1953.584
Log Likelihood −2291.521 −1080.610 −639.608
Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) report the results of the OLS regressions examining the relationship between CEO political
ideology and dividend payout as per Eq. 1. The dependent variable is the dividend payout measured as common dividends
over net income. The key independent variables indicate CEO political ideology, distinguishing between the following three
categories of CEO: liberals, conservatives, and nonpartisans. Columns (5), (6), and (7) are the estimated marginal effects of
logit models predicting the probability of the firm being a dividend-payer. The dependent variable is an indicator variable,
which takes the value of one if the firm is a dividend-paying firm, and zero otherwise. The Appendix contains the definition
of all the variables. Heteroskedasticity robust and firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate the significance of the coefficient estimate at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Changes in the dividend around CEO appointments.
Dependent Variable: Change in Dividend Per Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Intercept −0.030 −0.130 0.020 −0.044 −0.145 0.011 −0.053 −0.150 0.003
(0.081) (0.132) (0.106) (0.082) (0.138) (0.110) (0.101) (0.156) (0.162)
Treated 0.164∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.093) (0.071) (0.067) (0.106) (0.123) (0.090) (0.162)
Net Incomea−1 1.191∗ 3.009∗∗ 1.500∗ 1.330∗ 3.173∗∗ 1.610∗∗ 1.558∗∗ 3.111∗∗ 1.555∗∗
(0.656) (1.228) (0.782) (0.679) (1.281) (0.790) (0.596) (1.221) (0.668)
Change in net income 0.824 2.952∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ 0.899 3.050∗∗ 1.800∗∗∗ 0.946 2.902∗∗ 1.693∗∗∗
(0.597) (1.421) (0.563) (0.618) (1.482) (0.573) (0.593) (1.403) (0.462)
Dividend per sharea−1 1.063∗ 1.111 1.307∗∗ 1.294∗ 1.262 1.319∗∗ 1.194∗∗ 1.202 1.342∗∗
(0.617) (0.759) (0.534) (0.649) (0.809) (0.613) (0.535) (0.728) (0.514)
Dividend per sharea−2 −1.212∗ −1.334∗ −1.340∗∗ −1.449∗∗ −1.488∗ −1.351∗∗ −1.339∗∗ −1.415∗ −1.361∗∗∗
(0.644) (0.755) (0.530) (0.676) (0.802) (0.607) (0.559) (0.713) (0.494)
Downsizing (employee) −0.001∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Treated * Downsizing (employee) 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Divestment (asset) 0.137 0.043 0.039
(0.298) (0.254) (0.263)
Treated * Divestment (asset) 0.557∗ 0.363∗ 0.372
(0.294) (0.183) (0.274)
R2 0.390 0.348 0.300 0.437 0.369 0.324 0.436 0.359 0.330
Num. obs. 42 44 40 42 44 40 42 44 40
F statistic 4.596 4.055 2.911 3.776 3.003 2.189 3.749 2.886 2.257
Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the result of OLS regressions explaining the change in the dividend per share from one year
prior to the new CEO appointment to one, two, and three years after the appointment, respectively. Columns (4) to (6) are
similar to Columns (1) to (3) but also contain the interaction term between Treated and Downsizing. Columns (7) to (9)
are similar to Columns (1) to (3) but also contain the interaction term between Treated and Divestment. Downsizing is the
number of employees one year before the appointment minus the number of employees one (Column (4)), two years (Column
(5)), and three years (Column (6)) after the appointment. A positive number corresponds to a reduction in the workforce.
Divestment is the logarithm of one plus total assets one year before the appointment minus the logarithm of one plus total
assets one year (Column (7)), two years (Column (8)), and three years (Column (9)) after the appointment. A positive number
corresponds to a reduction in total assets. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
the significance of the coefficient estimate at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Dynamic panel data models estimating the effects of CEO political ideology on
firm performance and firm value.
Dependent Variable ROA Tobin’s q
OLS Fixed effects System GMM OLS Fixed effects System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conservatives 0.105∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.691 1.162∗∗∗ 2.906∗∗∗ -0.357
(0.017) (0.060) (0.505) (0.224) (0.690) (3.277)
Liberals 0.105∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.464 1.169∗∗∗ 2.976∗∗∗ 1.282
(0.016) (0.059) (0.444) (0.223) (0.697) (2.697)
NonPartisans 0.105∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.356 1.147∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 0.928
(0.016) (0.061) (0.440) (0.221) (0.689) (2.824)
Firm sizet−1 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.096∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.169
(0.001) (0.006) (0.025) (0.014) (0.082) (0.143)
Firm aget−1 -0.000 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
Cash holdingst−1 -0.002 -0.038∗ 0.040 0.699∗∗∗ 0.029 0.840
(0.012) (0.019) (0.149) (0.192) (0.328) (0.736)
Leveraget−1 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗ -0.064 0.055 -0.263
(0.010) (0.017) (0.073) (0.095) (0.167) (0.515)
R&Dt−1 -0.059 -0.131 1.098 0.083 0.260 1.053
(0.042) (0.092) (1.313) (0.554) (1.572) (2.423)
Asset tangibilityt−1 -0.004 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.249 -0.126∗∗∗ -0.233 0.443
(0.005) (0.022) (0.205) (0.045) (0.191) (1.329)
Board independencet−1 0.022∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.070 0.186∗ -0.194 0.208
(0.008) (0.016) (0.065) (0.098) (0.181) (0.570)
Board sizet−1 -0.000 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.022∗∗ 0.040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.026)
CEO dualityt−1 -0.001 -0.003 0.054 0.052 0.070 0.446
(0.002) (0.003) (0.037) (0.032) (0.047) (0.344)
CEO aget−1 0.000 0.000 -0.013 0.000 0.012∗∗ 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.033)
CEO tenuret−1 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.000 -0.008 0.080
(0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.051)
E-Indext−1 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.004 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.041
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.061)
ROAt−1 0.780∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.047) (0.193)
Tobin’s qt−1 0.754∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.044) (0.174)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2739 2739 2464 2441 2441 2441
R 0.935 0.957 0.939 0.954
No. of instruments 48 51
AR1 (p-value) 0.001 0.014
AR2 (p-value) 0.843 0.115
Sargan (p-value) 0.450 0.416
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.659 0.438
This table reports the results from OLS, firm-fixed effects (FE) and system generalized method-of-moments (System GMM)
regressions estimating the effects of CEO political ideology on firm performance and firm value. The key independent variables
measure CEO political ideology, distinguishing between the following three categories of CEO: liberals, conservatives, and
nonpartisans. The dependent variable in the first three columns is firm performance as measured by ROA in year t. The
dependent variable in the last three columns is firm value as measured by Tobin’s q in year t. All the independent variables are
measured in year t–1. The Appendix contains the definition of all the variables. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance of the coefficient estimates at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Propensity score matching.
Panel A: Logit regressions predicting selection of CEOs into firms.
Dependent variable: An indicator variable (1 = conservative CEO, 0 = liberal CEO)
(1) (2)
Logit Logit
Before matching After matching
Tobin’s qt−1 0.005 0.031
(0.020) (0.067)
ROAt−1 0.676∗∗ -0.513
(0.337) (0.928)
Firm sizet−1 -0.000 -0.018
(0.022) (0.066)
Firm aget−1 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Cash holdingst−1 -0.309∗ 0.177
(0.170) (0.435)
Leveraget−1 -0.078 0.260
(0.127) (0.385)
R&Dt−1 -0.820 0.251
(0.621) (2.196)
Asset tangibilityt−1 0.099 0.129
(0.138) (0.453)
Board independencet−1 0.115 0.442
(0.144) (0.404)
Board sizet−1 -0.010 0.005
(0.010) (0.028)
CEO dualityt−1 0.018 0.000
(0.041) (0.107)
CEO aget−1 0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.010)
CEO tenuret−1 -0.002 0.004
(0.006) (0.017)
E-Indext−1 0.020 -0.025
(0.016) (0.049)
Divestmentt−1 0.079 0.118
(0.105) (0.338)
Downsizingt−1 -0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.008)
Industry effects Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Num. obs. 1023 390
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.051
Panel B: Comparing treatment and control groups after matching.
Variable Means Treated Means Control Mean Diff t stat p value
Tobin’s qt−1 2.26 2.07 0.19 1.40 0.16
ROAt−1 0.18 0.17 0.01 1.48 0.14
Firm sizet−1 8.99 9.06 -0.07 -0.58 0.56
Firm aget−1 4.82 5.13 -0.31 -0.16 0.87
Cash holdingst−1 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.68 0.50
Leveraget−1 0.28 0.28 0.004 0.22 0.82
R&Dt−1 0.02 0.02 -0.001 -0.35 0.73
Asset tangibilityt−1 0.34 0.30 0.04 1.41 0.16
Board independencet−1 0.76 0.76 -0.004 -0.30 0.77
Board sizet−1 10.41 10.48 -0.07 -0.30 0.77
CEO dualityt−1 0.55 0.57 -0.02 -0.50 0.62
CEO aget−1 56.70 56.38 0.32 0.53 0.60
CEO tenuret−1 5.19 5.08 0.11 0.34 0.73
E-Indext−1 2.61 2.76 -0.15 -0.99 0.32
Divestmentt−1 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -1.01 0.31
Downsizingt−1 -0.92 -0.79 -0.13 -0.18 0.86
Panel C: Average treatment effect on treated (ATT)
Variable Estimate T-Stat P-Value
Dividend/NI 0.080 1.968 0.049
Dividend/TA 0.007 3.501 0.000
Dividend/Sales 0.012 3.961 0.000
Dividend yield 0.003 1.918 0.055
Dividend per share 0.168 2.342 0.019
The table presents the results from the propensity score matching (PSM) analysis. The Appendix
contains the definition of all the variables. Panel A reports the results from the pre-matching
logit (Column (1)) and the post-matching logit (Column (2)). Panel B presents the differences in
the observables between the treatment group (i.e., firm-year observations with conservative CEOs)
and the control group (i.e., firm-year observations with liberal CEOs). Panel C reports the average
treatment effect on treated (ATT) using the five different measures of the dividend payout. * and
** indicate the significance of the coefficient estimate at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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